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Civil Procedure 






Since recognizing, in 1998, that “jurisdiction . . . is a word of 
many, too many meanings,”2 the Supreme Court has engaged in a 
deliberate effort to bring discipline to the process of characterizing 
a rule as either jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.3 That effort is 
to be applauded. Because parties and courts are prone to 
characterizing a rule as jurisdictional when they really mean 
emphatic, important, or mandatory, the Court’s effort has brought 
more attention and care to the use of the jurisdictional label by 
courts and litigants. The Court’s effort also has useful principles 
for resolving the characterization inquiry. Because questions of 
jurisdictionality arise frequently and because late-discovered 
jurisdictional transgressions waste significant judicial and litigant 
resources, the Court’s effort appropriately seeks solutions for a 
pervasive and harmful problem.4 
The result of this effort has culminated in the articulation of a 
tripartite framework for resolving jurisdictional characterizations, 
which the Court set out authoritatively in 2017 in Hamer v. 
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago.5  
First, because “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower 
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” nonstatutory rules 
cannot be jurisdictional.6 Thus, limits contained only in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, among others, are always 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Scott Dodson, A Critique of 
Jurisdictionality, 39 REV. LITIG. 355 (2020). 
2 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). 
3 Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 620–21 
(2017). 
4 Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008). 
5 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017). 
6 Id. at 17. 
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nonjurisdictional.7 Analogously, because only Congress may 
define the jurisdiction of Article I agencies, adjudicatory rules set 
internally by agencies must also be nonjurisdictional.8 
Second, a statutory deadline governing case transfer between 
Article III courts is jurisdictional.9 This category seems quite 
small; to date, only statutory deadlines governing civil appeals and 
(perhaps) civil petitions for certiorari characterized as 
jurisdictional.10 By definition, this category excludes both transfer 
deadlines that are nonstatutory11 and statutory deadlines that do 
not involve the transfer of the case between Article III courts.12 
Third, all other statutory limits are jurisdictional only if 
Congress clearly so states.13 In adopting the clear-statement rule 
for this category, the Court has insisted that Congress need not 
“incant magic words.”14 Rather, “traditional tools of statutory 
construction,” including text, context, and precedent, “must 
plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with 
jurisdictional consequences.”15 This clear-statement rule has 
proven fatal to all proffered jurisdictional characterizations.16 
 
7 Id. at 20. 
8 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009). 
9 Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18. 
10 Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 
33, 45 (1990). 
11 E.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970) (holding the 
rule-based deadline for filing a criminal petition for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court to be nonjurisdictional). 
12 E.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (holding 
nonjurisdictional the statutory 120-day deadline for a losing veteran to 
file a notice of appeal with the Article I Veterans Court). 
13 Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 n.9; see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 
14 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013). 
15 United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631–33 (2015). 
16 In one case, the Court held the Tucker Act’s filing deadline to be a 
“more absolute” bar that requires sua sponte policing by the courts but 
very carefully avoided an express characterization of the deadline as 
jurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
130, 134, 139 (2008). Bowles held a statutory appellate deadline to be 
jurisdictional but primarily based on precedent, Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206, 
and Hamer subsequently classified Bowles as falling under the second 
factor of the framework, Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18. 
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The Court has declared this tripartite framework “readily 
administrable”17 and “clear and easy to apply,”18 virtues it 
regularly strives to achieve in jurisdictional doctrine. Yet a set of 
new complications and oddities has arisen. These infirmities 
suggest that the Court’s framework is not—and may never be—
as clear, easy, or administrable as the Court has professed. In this 
Chapter, I expose the weaknesses of the present framework and 
offer some perspectives for reforming that doctrine in ways that 




The first factor—that only statutes can be jurisdictional—is 
actually false because court rules can be jurisdictional. Take, for 
example, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court 
has promulgated rules to govern such proceedings, and those rules 
could potentially be jurisdictional notwithstanding their 
nonstatutory basis.19 
Even lower-court rules could be jurisdictional if Congress 
delegates the power to make jurisdictional rules to the Supreme 
Court. Congress already has done so in several instances, 
including by authorizing court-created rules “defin[ing] when a 
ruling of a district court is final for purposes of appeal”20 and 
“provid[ing] for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the 
courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for [by statute].”21 
The Supreme Court has accepted those delegations and 
promulgated rules under them,22 rules that themselves could be 
jurisdictional despite the lack of any parallel statutory language. 
Rule 23(f), promulgated pursuant to that delegation, is a good 
 
17 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–16. 
18 Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20. 
19 Supreme Court Rule 17, for example, states that the “initial pleading 
shall be preceded by a motion for leave to file,” SUP. CT. R. 17(3), and it 
is at least arguable that the failure to file such a motion could be deemed 
a jurisdictional defect to any subsequent pleading. 
20 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c). 
21 Id. § 1292(e). 
22 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) (prescribing the tolling effect of post-
judgment motions); id. 5(a) (providing for interlocutory appeals); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing for interlocutory appeal of a class-
certification decision). 
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example of a nonstatutory rule that could be characterized as 
jurisdictional because it sets the parameters by which a case 
moves from the authority of a district court to the authority of a 
circuit court. It’s hard to imagine anything that would be more 
jurisdictional. 
Nevertheless, in Nutraceutical v. Lambert, the Supreme Court 
characterized Rule 23(f) as nonjurisdictional under the first 
Hamer factor, saying perfunctorily, “because Rule 23(f)’s time 
limitation is found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly 
classified as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.”23 Whether 
Rule 23(f) is jurisdictional is debatable. But it cannot be 
nonjurisdictional simply because it is nonstatutory. Rule 23(f) is 
the product of a delegation from Congress to the Court of 
jurisdiction-setting authority. Nutraceutical’s reliance on the first 
Hamer factor was therefore misplaced. 
The second factor in the Hamer framework—that statutory 
time prescriptions for the transfer of a case from one Article III 
court to another are always jurisdictional—causes some oddities. 
Venue transfer, for example, is a statutory mechanism of 
transferring adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to 
another. The general venue-transfer statutes do not have specified 
time prescriptions in them, but Congress certainly could so 
provide. And the MDL venue-transfer provision does have a time 
prescription: “Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the 
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to 
the district from which it was transferred . . . .”24 The second 
Hamer factor thus seems to make this time prescription for MDL 
venue transfer jurisdictional, such that the MDL transferee court 
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a transferred case after the 
conclusion of pretrial proceedings.25  
Yet a jurisdictional characterization for a venue rule is more 
than a little awkward, for venue has long been deemed 
 
23 139 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2019). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
25 Other specialized venue-transfer statutes have similar timing 
provisions. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (allowing inter-district transfer of 
a criminal tax case if the defendant files a motion “within twenty days 
after arraignment”). 
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nonjurisdictional by the Court,26 and the civil venue statute 
expressly disavows that it is jurisdictional.27 Further, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that while the MDL-transfer time prescription 
might be waivable by the parties and thus not jurisdictional,28 a 
conclusion that major treatises and a majority of lower courts 
support.29 How surprised MDL practitioners and courts must be to 
find that Hamer invalidates such waivers because the MDL-
transfer time prescription is jurisdictional! 
The third Hamer factor—the clear-statement rule against 
jurisdiction—suffers from the most complexity. That is peculiar 
because a clear-statement rule is supposed to make things easy: if 
the provision does not “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in 
any way to the jurisdiction of the court,”30 the provision should be 
nonjurisdictional, end of inquiry. But the Court has been faint-
hearted about rigid adherence to the clear-statement rule. Instead, 
the Court has declared repeatedly that Congress need not “incant 
magic words.”31 Rather, “traditional tools of statutory 
construction,” including text, context, and precedent, “must 
plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with 
jurisdictional consequences.”32 
The result is clearly not a clear-statement rule, at least not one 
that has recognizable analogues in other areas. Clear-statement 
rules typically do not require consideration of the messiness of 
precedent or statutory purpose. After all, the very purpose of 
having a clear-statement rule in the first place is to avoid the 
messiness of ordinary statutory interpretation. Yet the Court has, 
under the third factor’s “clear-statement rule,” engaged in 
substantial interrogations of context, precedent, and statutory 
purpose.33  
 
26 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipping Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167–68 
(1939). 
27 28 U.S.C. § 1390(a); id. § 1406(b). 
28 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
35, 36 n.1 (1998). 
29 E.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2002). 
30 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982). 
31 Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 n.9 
(2017). 
32 United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631–33 (2015). 
33 E.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440–41 (2011); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010). 
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In United States v. Wong, for example, the Court considered 
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act provision stating that an 
untimely action shall be “forever barred” is jurisdictional. The 
five-justice majority characterized the language to not speak in 
jurisdictional terms or address the power of the courts.34 The four-
justice dissent, reading the same language, disagreed, 
characterizing the language as “absolute” and with “no 
exceptions.”35 To the justices, the clear-statement rule appeared to 
point in opposite directions. 
The Court split again on a third-factor case in Patchak v. 
Zinke,36 which called for the interpretation of a statute stating that 
a certain kind of action “shall not be filed or maintained in a 
Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”37 A plurality of 
four justices would have held the statute jurisdictional because it 
“uses jurisdictional language” by directing that an action shall not 
be filed or maintained but shall be dismissed.38 According to the 
plurality, the statute “completely prohibits actions” and thus “is 
best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute.”39 Two justices 
concurred without reaching the jurisdictionality issue, but the 
three dissenting justices disagreed that the statute was 
jurisdictional. In their eyes, the statute “does not clearly state that 
it imposes a jurisdictional restriction.”40 Again, the clear-
statement rule was of little use. 
If each Hamer factor on its own generates uncertainty and 
confusion, then consider the anomalies created by the interplay of 
the factors.  
One anomaly concerns criminal and civil appellate deadlines. 
The time to file a notice of appeal is prescribed by statute for civil 
cases but only by rule for certain criminal cases.41 As a result, the 
statutory civil deadline is jurisdictional, but the nonstatutory 
 
34 Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633. 
35 Id. at 1640 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The FTCA’s filing deadlines are 
jurisdictional.”). 
36 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). 
37 Id. at 904 (Thomas, J.). 
38 Id. at 905 (Thomas, J.). 
39 Id. at 906 (Thomas, J.). 
40 Id. at 918–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
41 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (civil); FED. R. APP. P. 4 (criminal). A statutory 
deadline applies to appeals of certain criminal matters by the United 
States government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  
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criminal deadline cannot be. The same anomaly inheres in the 
deadline to file a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
the civil deadline is jurisdictional because it is in a statute, yet the 
criminal deadline is nonjurisdictional because it is set out only in 
a court rule.42 It is difficult to fathom a compelling reason—and 
the Court has not attempted to offer one—why the civil versions 
of the certiorari deadlines should be typed jurisdictional, and the 
criminal versions should not. 
Deeper anomalies lurk. The statutory civil certiorari deadline 
applies regardless of whether the reviewed court is a federal court 
or a state court.43 When certiorari is from a federal, Article III 
court, then the second factor of the framework makes that 
statutory deadline automatically jurisdictional. But when 
certiorari is from a state court or an Article I court, then that same 
statutory deadline falls outside of the second factor and instead 
must be evaluated according to the third factor’s presumption 
against jurisdictionality. The Court’s framework thus subjects the 
same statutory provision to varying jurisdictional analyses 
depending upon the circumstances, perhaps resulting in the 
peculiar conclusion that the civil certiorari deadline is 
jurisdictional for some petitions but nonjurisdictional for others.44 
The same peculiarity inheres in the statutory conditions for U.S. 
Courts of Appeals to hear bankruptcy appeals directly from either 




These complications, oddities, and anomalies of the Hamer 
factors undermine the Court’s attestation of a clear and simple 
jurisdictional framework. Two modest fixes and one strategic ploy 
could dramatically improve it going forward. 
 
42 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (civil); SUP. CT. R. 13.1 (criminal). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). 
44 If the Court were to modify its framework to include in the second 
factor transfers between state and federal courts, then it will run up 
against the removal statute, which includes many timing prescriptions 
that the lower federal courts have roundly declared nonjurisdictional. See 
Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
55, 65–70 (2008). 
45 28 U.S.C. § 158. 
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The first fix would change the first factor to exempt 
nonstatutory rules from the jurisdictional characterization unless 
Congress either lacks the jurisdictional-control authority in the 
first place or has lawfully delegated that authority to the 
rulemaker. This change would recognize the fact that some 
nonstatutory rules might be jurisdictional, such as the Supreme 
Court’s own rules or rules promulgated under jurisdiction-
delegating statutes.  
The second fix would eliminate the second factor and change 
the third factor to follow a more traditionally rigid clear-statement 
approach. This change would preserve the nonjurisdictional status 
of venue statutes and would simplify the application of the clear-
statement rule going forward. 
The strategic ploy is to avoid, whenever possible in hard 
cases, the jurisdictional question altogether. Avoidance is 
possible—perhaps even preferable—if dismissal is appropriate on 
other nonmerits grounds.46 Avoidance is also possible if the rule 
must be enforced whether or not jurisdictional. In other words, if 
the real question in the case is whether the rule at issue is subject 
to equitable exceptions or to party waiver, then the court can 
answer that question directly in the negative without needing to 
reach the jurisdictional question. Looking to other grounds to 
resolve the case—such as nonmerits grounds or the particular 
effects of the rule—can enable courts to avoid hard questions of 





The Court’s jurisdictionality doctrine is showing signs of 
wear. My primary aim has been to call attention to its fissures and 
instabilities so that they can be corrected—through rebuilding or 




46 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 431 
(2007). 
47 The Court has taken this approach on occasion. E.g., Manrique v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1271–72 (2017). 
